

## Article

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**Who Benefits from the Uniformity of Contingent Fee Rates?**

**Abstract:** L (CF) A U I CF C I CF I CF ( ) “ ”

**Keywords:** , U

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**1 Introduction**

C (CF) U

5.  $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \delta(x) dx = 1$

6.  $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \delta(x) f(x) dx = f(0)$

7.  $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \delta(x) f(x) dx = f(0)$

8.  $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \delta(x) f(x) dx = f(0)$

9.  $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \delta(x) f(x) dx = f(0)$

10.  $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \delta(x) f(x) dx = f(0)$







G (2004) H (1993) CF

F (1993) CF

( )

A (2000) F (2005) C

( )

D (D, 2010). CF

CF A

### 3 The model

CF (1, 2)

The image shows a complex musical score with multiple staves. The notation includes various notes, rests, and dynamic markings such as 'F' and '<math>\times^2</math>'. The score is arranged in two main systems, each with multiple staves. The notation is dense and includes various musical symbols and clefs.





U. S. E. & C. A.  
L. A. L. B.  
9 / 1 06 ( C F-398.45 )-46 ( )-40.2961

10<sup>5</sup> G



CF

The image shows a musical score for two staves. The notation is dense and includes various musical symbols such as notes, rests, and dynamic markings. The score is divided into three distinct sections by vertical bar lines. The first section on the left contains several measures with notes and rests. The middle section is marked with a 'CF' annotation. The right section contains more complex notation, including a measure with a '7' above it and a 'U' above it. The overall appearance is that of a handwritten or printed musical manuscript.

## 4.2 Information asymmetry

C (1993), C (2012).  
B (2003:94-95; D (2011), D (1993);

I (1993), I (2012), I (1993), I (2012).

B (1993), B (2012), B (1993), B (2012).

A (1993), A (2012), A (1993), A (2012).

A (1993), A (2012), A (1993), A (2012).

A (1993), A (2012), A (1993), A (2012).

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A (1993), A (2012), A (1993), A (2012).

A (1993), A (2012), A (1993), A (2012).


A (1993), A (2012), A (1993), A (2012).

A (1993), A (2012), A (1993), A (2012).

A (1993), A (2012), A (1993), A (2012).



ε



μ

K (1998); (1997; 2001; D (2009:322-323).  
 (B-H (1996),  
 CF), (2001:550).

#### 4.4 Risk aversion

( ), CF  
 CF  
 ( 1970; 1987; 1991;  
 1994:43-45). CF  
 CF  
 ( )

#### 4.5 Varying the amount of work

CF  
 13  
 w  
 CF  
 (E, 1993:505-511),  
 I  
 )  
 ( \* )  
 ( \* )<sup>15</sup>  
 H  
 CF



## 4.6 Search costs

C

\$800. G. CF  
 L. A, H, CF  
 (\$650 L B \$600 L A). ( )  
 ( )  
 CF )  
 A  
 A B, B ( )  
 1998:368). A B CF  
 A B. B. H<sup>16</sup> H  
 CF B - CF  
 I CF  
 D  
 4.1 CF  
 ( )  


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 16 4

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \left( \frac{1}{i} - \frac{1}{i+1} \right) = \frac{1}{1} - \frac{1}{n+1} = \frac{n}{n+1}$$

C (2002),  
CF  
CF  
L  
F  
CF  
I  
CF  
CF  
CF



$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{5.6.}$$

2010年9月  
2011年10月  
2012年11月  
2013年12月  
2014年1月  
2015年2月  
2016年3月  
2017年4月  
2018年5月  
2019年6月  
2020年7月  
2021年8月  
2022年9月  
2023年10月  
2024年11月  
2025年12月

A  
 H  
 , 1979; G , 1990:896).  
 CF  
 CF  
 A  
 3,  
 CF  
 )  
 CF



( ),  
( ),  
L ( , 2001;  
K , 2004:58-60). H  
( )  
( )





1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

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