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2. Distributive justice, in U. Procaccia (ed.): *A Handbook of Law and Economics* (in Hebrew), 2012, pp. 113{150.
3. Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds? The case against the harmonization of private law (with Uriel Procaccia), in K.J. Hopt & E. Wymeersch (eds.): *Capital Markets and Company Law*, 639{659. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

4. Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility, in L. Luini (ed.): *Uncertain Decisions*, 39{52. Boston: Kluwer AP, 1999.
5. The independence axiom versus the reduction axiom: Must we have both? In W. Edwards (ed.): *Utility Theories: Measurement and Applications*, 165{183. Boston: Kluwer AP, 1992.

## Books

1. Mathematics for Economists 1 (with A. Rubinstein). Jerusalem: Academic, 1981 (In Hebrew).
2. Mathematics for Economists. Tel Aviv: Everyman University. 1993 (in Hebrew).

## Editorial Boards

Econometrica (Associate Editor 1995{2010)

Journal of Economic Theory (Associate Editor 2012{2014)

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Advisory Editor 1991{94, Associate Editor 1994{)

Theoretical Economics (Associate Editor 2005{)

Economics Letters (Associate Editor 2018{2023)

Senior program committee, 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2017

Program committee, Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2009

## Other

Fellow of the Econometric Society (2012)

Economic Theory Fellow (2011)

## Research Grants

Connaught Fund #3-370-156-90, 1987 (two years).

SSHRC #410-87-1375, 1987 (one year).

SSHRC #410-88-0558, 1988 (two years).

SSHRC #410-90-1494, 1990: Applications of non-expected utility models (two years).

SSHRC #410-92-0622, 1992: Theoretical foundations of experimental decision theory (three years).

SSHRC #410-95-0168, 1995: Decision theory and preferences for fairness (three years).